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Abstract
Introduction
California’s Workers’ Compensation System (CAWCS) Department of Industrial Relations
questioned the adequacy of the current Medi-Cal fee-schedule pricing and requested analy-
sis of alternatives that maximize price availability and maintain budget neutrality.
Objectives
To compare CAWCS pharmacy-dispensed (PD) drug prices under alternative fee sched-
ules, and identify combinations of alternative benchmarks that have prices available for the
largest percentage of PD drugs and that best reach budget neutrality.
Methods
Claims transaction-level data (2011–2013) from CAWCS were used to estimate total annual
PD pharmaceutical payments. Medi-Cal pricing data was from the Workman’s Compensa-
tion Insurance System (WCIS). Average Wholesale Prices (AWP), Wholesale Acquisition
Costs (WAC), Direct Prices (DP), Federal Upper Limit (FUL) prices, and National Average
Drug Acquisition Costs (NADAC) were from Medi-Span. We matched National Drug Codes
(NDCs), pricing dates, and drug quantity for comparisons. We report pharmacy-dispensed
(PD) claims frequency, reimbursement matching rate, and paid costs by CAWCS as the ref-
erence price against all alternative price benchmarks.
Results
Of 12,529,977 CAWCS claims for pharmaceutical products 11.6% (1,462,814) were for PD
drugs. Prescription drug cost for CAWCS was over $152M; $63.9M, $47.9M, and $40.6M in
2011–2013. Ninety seven percent of these CAWCS PD claims had a Medi-Cal price. Alter-
native mechanisms provided a price for fewer claims; NADAC 94.23%, AWP 90.94%, FUL
73.11%, WAC 66.98%, and DP 14.33%. Among CAWCS drugs with no Medi-Cal price in
PD claims, AWP, WAC, NADAC, DP, and FUL provided prices for 96.7%, 63.14%, 24.82%,
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20.83%, and 15.08% of claims. Overall CAWCS paid 100.52% of Medi-Cal, 60% of AWP,
97% of WAC, 309.53% of FUL, 103.83% of DP, and 136.27% of NADAC.
Conclusions
CAWCS current Medi-Cal fee-schedule price list for PD drugs is more complete than all
alternative fee-schedules. However, all reimbursement approaches would require combina-
tions of pricing benchmarks. We suggest keeping primary reimbursement at 100% of Medi-
Cal and for drugs without a primary Medi-Cal price calculating the maximum fee as 60% of
AWP and then 97% of WAC. Alternatively, we suggest using NADAC as a primary fee-
schedule followed by either 60% AWP and 97% WAC or AWP-40% for drugs with no
NADAC price. Fee-schedules may not offer the best price and a formulary approach may
provide more flexibility.
Introduction
The net spending on prescription drugs in the United States has been rising more rapidly than
the Consumer Price Index for all items,[1] increasing by 20% between 2013–2015[2]. High
drug costs affect all sectors of the healthcare system including the Workers’ Compensation Sys-
tem (WC).[3] WC is a state-based liability insurance program that most employers are
required to pay into in order to fund the medical bills, recovery costs and partial missed wages
when an employee is injured at work. The WC insurance and medical care are separate from a
companies’ health insurance and are usually provided free-of-charge to an injured worker,
unlike services provided under the employee’s standard employment health insurance. In
2014, pharmacy costs accounted for 18% of total WC insured medical spending; paying an
average $1,583 on prescription drugs for every injured worker.[4] In the United States there is
a general lack of transparency in drug prices. It is not clear that the fee-schedule approach,
such as that used by many worker’s compensation systems, gives payers the best prices5. For
example, the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI) found that WC
insurers paid an average of 125% of AWP compared with 72% paid by private negotiated
insurance contracts.[5] In general, payers arrive at the drug prices they pay in a number of
ways; including contract pricing with or without the use of a fee-schedule of allowed drugs, or
based on government regulation of prices for Medicare, Medicaid, CAWCS, and Veterans
administration programs. All of these methods of drug pricing are then based on a specific
price per drug using one of the available lists of calculated prices discussed in detail later in
this paper.
California is the largest workers’ compensation system in the U.S, comprising approxi-
mately 25% of the entire nations’ workers’ compensation premiums.[6] Beginning in 2004, the
state required the CAWCS Official Medical Fee-Schedule (OMFS) reimburse both brand and
generic drugs at 100% of Medi-Cal (California’s Medicaid) outpatient pharmacy fee-schedule,
as its primary payment system. This practice resulted in tying CAWCS’s reimbursement to the
state- and federal-based rebate negotiations made external to the CAWCS itself.[7] Therefore
their changes were not transparent to CAWCS pricing needs. For drugs not covered by a
Medi-Cal payment system (such as for repackaged drugs), the secondary payment system was
the maximum fee paid, calculated as 83% of AWP of the lowest therapeutically equivalent drug
(calculated on per unit basis) + $7.25 to pharmacists as a dispensing fee ($8.00 if the patient is
Drug pricing methods in California Workers’ Compensation
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in a skilled nursing or intermediate care facility).[8] After adapting to the new Medi-Cal-based
reimbursement system, drug spending by CAWCS declined by 27% from 2004 to 2007, but
then increased by 42% from 2007 to 2013.[9] Medi-Cal initially was a good fit as a pricing
benchmark for CAWCS because outpatient prescription drug coverage included all federally
required drug classes, also required by CAWCS regulations, yet had strong price controls.
Medi-Call controlled their own prescription unit price drug spending primarily by maximiz-
ing federal and state supplements rebates.[8] But as more Medi-Cal beneficiaries moved to
managed care plans, Medi-Cal also implemented utilization controls and co-payments, not
allowed under the CAWCS fee-schedule system regulations. The drugs used by managed care
beneficiaries were also not included on the Medi-Cal primary fee-schedule price list used to
price the CAWCS fee-schedule drugs. In addition, the Medicare Part D benefit created by the
Medicare Modernization Act moved primary coverage for outpatient prescription drug cover-
age from Medi-Cal to Medicare for all dual-eligible beneficiaries. Despite Medi-Cal continuing
to pay for drugs in categories excluded from Part D and available to other Medi-Cal beneficia-
ries, CAWCS began seeing different and fewer drugs on the fee-for-service based Medi-Cal list
used as the primary payment system for its drugs. This required CAWCS to increasingly pay
based on the higher cost AWP-based secondary payment system.
Other changes also began to erode the stability of Medi-Cal as a pricing system for
CAWCS. For example, under ACA implementation in 2010, Medicaid payments were
required to be at an aggregate upper limit based on actual acquisition cost (AAC) as all pay-
ers of drugs wanted to move away from an AWP-based pricing toward this market-based
price approach. But as California began the process of transitioning to an AAC benchmark,
it was put on hold by California’s Department of Health Care Services (DHCS)[10] likely, in
part, because CMS began collecting and publishing a National Average Drug Acquisition
Cost (NADAC) to provide a national reference file to assist state Medicaid programs in eval-
uating their reimbursement. Currently Medi-Cal (and therefore CAWCS) has not moved
from the AWP-based pricing and still defines the pharmacy rate paid as the lower of (1)
AWP– 17%; (2) FUL; or (3) the maximum allowable ingredient cost (MAIC).[11] But all of
these changes have resulted in a lack of California Workers’ Compensation fee-schedule
prices for an increasing number of NDCs as well as delays in updating Medi-Cal price data.
[12]
CAWCS requested this analysis to address their doubts about the adequacy of the current
Medi-Cal pricing as its primary fee-schedule benchmark. They knew that as the number of
drug claims without a Medi-Cal price increased and required the higher secondary AWP-
based prices, they were no longer getting the lowest prices available for drugs. The goal of this
study was to determine alternatives for pricing their current fee-schedule that maximize price
availability and maintain access and budget neutrality. Alternative pricing benchmarks used
by both government (Medi-Cal, FUL and NADAC) and also by the private sector (AWP,
WAC, and DP) were assessed. Since there is little transparency in the drug prices across each
benchmark, the Medi-Cal-based prices over three years of CAWCS drug claims were used to
demonstrate how Medi-Cal payments compared with other government and private pricing
benchmarks that are the hallmarks of fee-schedule pricing methods.
This analysis compared CAWCS utilization and prices across years and used CAWCS
claims to compare retail pharmacy drug prices under alternative fee-schedules. Efficient alter-
native benchmarks that had the largest number of listed prices were also identified. In addi-
tion, the prices of the same set of CAWCS drugs across both government and private pricing
methods was compared to elucidate their price transparency nationally for others using fee-
schedule drug pricing.
Drug pricing methods in California Workers’ Compensation
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Materials and methods
The study protocol was exempted by the institutional review board (IRB) of University of Cali-
fornia, San Francisco. Claims data with no identifiers were used so no informed consent was
required from patients.
Data sources
Several datasets were used to analyze drug prices within a pharmaceutical fee-schedule
approach to pricing: 1) the Workers’ Compensation Information System (WCIS), 2) A Medi-
Span data set including drug prices for five different private pricing mechanisms, and 3) Medi-
Cal and NADAC drug prices available by CMS on-line. Claims level data from WCIS covering
pharmacy transaction costs were used to estimate total annual pharmacy-dispensed (PD) drug
utilization and costs from January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2013. WCIS data was divided
into four claims data subsets; physician-dispensed and administered drugs, compounded
drugs, medical foods, and physician-dispensed (PD) drugs. Only the PD drug claims data was
used in this study because any regulatory changes arising from our analysis are unique to PD
drugs. Claims records included the date of service, billed amount, paid amount, claim identifi-
ers, patient identifiers, NDC, dispensing agent, drug dispensed, dispensing fee, quantity dis-
pensed, and other supporting information. Service adjustment codes indicated the reason for
any discrepancy between billed and paid amounts, and allowed us to remove duplicate and
zero billed records appropriately. Each drug claim had an 11-digit NDC which identified the
manufacturer, drug dispensed, strength of the drug, and the wholesale package size. Drug ther-
apeutic class was assigned to each line item by pharmacist experts in the field. Weekly Medi-
Cal datasets of drug prices were obtained from WCIS to verify the drug prices in the claims
data set. CAWCS annual PD claims were then repriced with each different pricing benchmark
as described in Table 1. To provide greater transparency across these different pricing bench-
marks, each pricing alternative was compared with the sample portion of matched claims that
had an available list price in both CAWCS and that particular pricing benchmark. Two differ-
ent types of benchmarks are used; government pricing fee-schedules (FUL and NADAC)
whose prices are available on a government website, and private pricing benchmarks (AWP,
WAC and DP) whose fee-schedule prices must be purchased (Table 1). The Medi-Span dataset
included prices by NDC for five different pricing mechanisms used in this study: AWP, WAC,
DP, FUL, and NADAC (Table 1).[13] CAWCS drugs were repriced relative to other fee-
schedules for each NDC, using the unit of quantity dispensed and the date of service. All FUL,
and NADAC prices were converted to 2011, 2012, and 2013 US dollars using the US Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI-U) average for prescription drugs.[14] Our analysis excluded any
claims with a missing quantity dispensed, a pending payment status, a claim duplication, and
negative or zero total paid amounts.
Sample
CAWCS reimburses drugs dispensed by both pharmacies and by physicians. Despite being
reimbursed by the same fee-schedule, they each have a unique set of policies and regulations
governing their reimbursement and pricing. This study sample included only CAWCS pre-
scription drugs dispensed at the pharmacy retail (PD) level.
Data analysis
To compare the alternative pricing methods the reimbursed PD prescriptions were evaluated
at the transaction level, and reported as PD claims frequency, reimbursement rate, and total &
Drug pricing methods in California Workers’ Compensation
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average paid costs across years. Estimated costs for different pricing benchmarks were com-
pared to the actual amount paid by CAWCS. We matched each claim line in CAWCS by NDC
and the dates of service to the corresponding unit price of an alternative price benchmark.
Each unit price from different price benchmarks was multiplied by the quantity unit dispensed
in CAWCS. For PD claims that had no prices under different primary price benchmarks, we
calculated the percentage and total amount paid by CAWCS for drugs with no listed primary
benchmark price. The results were compared across different primary and secondary price
benchmarks used in our study. Comparisons of CAWCS paid amounts with each alternative
price benchmark included a paired sample of the same drugs by NDC and amount. Descrip-
tive statistics and Analysis of variance (ANOVA) were performed to assess statistical differ-
ences in the change in drug expenditure over time. The statistical significance level was set at
0.05. All statistical analyses were conducted using Stata MP Version 14 and Microsoft Excel
2013.[15]
Results
Between 2011 and 2013, there were 20,373,477 total claims submitted (billed) to CAWCS. Of
these, 12,529,977 claims were for pharmaceutical products. Claims billed for pharmaceutical
products dispensed by pharmacies (PD) accounted for 11.6% (1,462,814) of all pharmaceutical
product claims. Numbers of PD claims billed of total billed claims decreased over the years;
595,849 (40.73%) claims in 2011, 476,203 (32.6%) claims in 2012, and 390,762 (26.7%) claims
in 2013. Of these billed claims, not all were reimbursed due to various types of errors in billing
or decisions not to pay the claim. Reimbursed (paid) PD claims in CAWCS represented
Table 1. Description and availability of alternative fee-schedule pricing benchmarks.
TYPE OF PRICING
BENCHMARK
DESCRIPTION AVAILABILITY 
Government Benchmarks
Federal Upper Limit (FUL) CMS calculates FUL as 175% of weighted average of the most recently reported
monthly average manufacturer price (AMP) for multiple source drug products
that are available in retail community pharmacies.[28]
Manufacturers report monthly AMP to CMS and
they calculate FUL. Medi-Cal FUL based prices are
reported on their website at Data.Medicaid.gov
[https://data.medicaid.gov/Drug-Pricing-and-
Payment/ACA-Federal-Upper-Limits/yns6-zx8k]
National Average Drug
Acquisition Cost
(NADAC)
Provide the average drug market prices paid in US as provided by periodic CMS
conducted surveys of randomly selected, retail community pharmacy prices
nationwide.[17]
NADAC prices are available on the Medicaid.gov
website (at Data.Medicaid.gov) from November,
2013 to the present. [https://www.medicaid.gov/
medicaid/prescription-drugs/pharmacy-pricing/
index.html] and
Private Benchmarks
Average Wholesale Price
(AWP)
A self-reported manufacturer price, but AWP does not really represent the
actual wholesale price paid by pharmacies after discount and rebates.[29]
Only available for purchase
Wholesale Acquisition Cost
(WAC)
The list price paid by the wholesaler or a direct purchaser for drugs purchased
from a drug manufacturer before any discounts, rebates, purchasing allowances
or other forms of economic consideration.[30]
Only available for purchase
Direct Price (DP) The list price used for invoices between drug manufacturers and pharmacies or
providers. Price before any discounts, rebates, purchasing allowances or other
forms of economic consideration.[31]
Only available for purchase
Note: Private Benchmark prices are only available for purchase from: Medi-Span from Wolters Kluwer, [http://www.wolterskluwercdi.com/drug-data/], Redbook from
Truven Health Analytics and Online from Micromedix, http://www.micromedixsolutions.com/, and First Databank [http://www.fdbhealth.com/fdb-medknowledge-
drug-pricing/]. They provide these prices for only those drugs that they can obtain from others so do not include prices for all NDCs. Medi-Span provided our drug
prices for the privately available benchmarks
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197449.t001
Drug pricing methods in California Workers’ Compensation
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approximately 69% (1,011,628) out of 1,462,814 total PDs billed claims in CAWCS across all 3
years (Table 2). Only reimbursed (paid) claims were included in our repricing analysis as this
represents amounts paid by CAWCS.
Current Medi-Cal based fee-schedule drug use and costs
Over the three years, the number of PD drug claims paid (CP) decreased from 495,759)) in
2011, 308,647 in 2012, and 207,222 CP in 2013 (P = 0.08) (Table 3). Between 2011 and 2013,
the cost (or actual amount paid) for PD prescription drugs in workers’ compensation for all
California employers was over $152 million; decreasing annually from $63.9 million in 2011,
to $47.9 million in 2012, and $40.6 million in 2013 (Table 2). The mean cost paid per claim,
however, increased over the time; $128.9 in 2011, $155.3 in 2012, and $197.2 in 2013 (data not
shown).
Repricing primary benchmarks
The total and annual number, percent and costs of CAWCS claims were first estimated using
each alternative fee- schedule (Table 2). On average, Medi-Cal, which CAWCS currently uses
to price their drugs, had a price for 97% of the drugs CAWCS paid over the 3 years; (96.3%
199,561 claims out of 207,222) in 2013. The percentage of CAWCS fee-schedule NDCs paid in
2013 that had an AWP-based NDC price was 96.41% (199,778 claims out of 207,222), while
94.36% (195,526 claims out of 207,222) had a NADAC-based NDC price, 80.12% (166,016
claims out of 207,222), had a WAC-based price, 75.56% (156,572 claims out of 207,222) had an
FUL-based price and only 13% (26,827 claims out of 207,222) had a DP in 2013 (Table 2).
Next, the current amount paid by CAWCS annually was compared to the percent difference in
and the total amount that would be paid for the same fee-schedule sample of NDCs when
using each different pricing benchmark (Table 2). In 2013 CAWCS paid 60.38% of AWP esti-
mated costs for the CAWCS drugs that also have a unit price under the AWP fee-schedule. For
the CAWCS drugs that also have a unit price under each alternative fee-schedule, CAWCS
paid 136.27% of NADAC estimated costs, 97.14% of WAC estimated costs, 309.53% of FUL
estimated costs, and 103.83% of DP estimated costs (Table 2). The CAWCS based formulas
varied by year for each pricing alternative that would be required to maintain budget neutrality
(Table 2).
Repricing secondary benchmarks
During the study period, an average of 3% (27,397 out of 1,011,628) of PD claims had no
Medi-Cal prices. These prescriptions account for 4.76% (approximately $5 million out of $115
million) of PD prescription payments. The percentage of PD claims that had no Medi-Cal
prices increased over the time, starting in 2011 when only 1.8% (8,876 claims out of 495,759)
had no Medi-Cal based price. These claims accounted for over $1 million in prescription pay-
ments. In 2012 the pricing lack increased to 3.5% (10,860 claims out of 308,647) and $2.6 mil-
lion in prescription payments, and in 2013 3.70% (7,661 claims out of 207,222) accounting for
over $1.6 million in payments (S1 Dataset). A comparison of the percentage of claims with list
prices available for each alternative pricing fee-schedule for only the fee-schedule sample of
NDCs that had no CAWCS Medi-Cal list price showed that AWP had the largest percentage
(96.7%) or (26,493 claims out of 27,397) and CAWCS paid 30% of AWP estimated costs for
these drugs under the AWP fee-schedule (Table 3). WAC had the next most list prices avail-
able for those claims with CAWCS Medi-Cal list price (63.1%) or (17,298 claims out of 27,397)
and CAWCS paid 33.3% of WAC for these drugs. The NADAC fee-schedule had list prices for
Drug pricing methods in California Workers’ Compensation
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only 24.8% (6,799 claims out of 27,397) of this sample; DP for only 20.8% (5,706 claims out of
27,397), and FUL for only 15% (4,131 claims out of 27,397) of this sample (Table 3).
The pricing implications of re-pricing the claims that have no Medi-Cal price along with
the formulas required to reach budget neutrality for each alternative benchmark for this sam-
ple are presented in Table 3.
Discussion
This study is unique as the first study that analyzed alternative price benchmarks for drugs dis-
pensed by pharmacies using a fee-schedule pricing system such as used by the CAWCS.
Table 2. Percent of CAWCS claims and differences in paid amount for the percent of CAWCS retail pharmaceuticals with NDC prices under current workers com-
pensation Medi-Cal fee-schedule and each alternative pricing benchmark by year.
Year % CAWCS
claims with drug
prices under
different pricing
benchmark
Amount paid by
CAWCS for claims
with drug prices
under each pricing
benchmark
Total Estimated Costs
(EC) using different
pricing benchmarks for
CAWCS claims with
drug prices available
The difference
between amount paid
by CAWCS and
Estimated Costs by
different pricing
benchmark
% Change (amount
paid by CAWCS/
EC by different
pricing
benchmark)
Formula to equalize the
amount paid by CAWCS (WC)
and EC when pricing by each
pricing benchmark for
Matched NDC’s to maintain
budget neutrality 
2011 MC 98.21% $55,022,480 $56,213,969 -$1,191,489 97.88% WC = MC—2.12%
2012 96.48% $31,765,886 $32,661,798 -$895,912 97.26% WC = MC—2.74%
2013 96.30% $22,869,387 $22,751,290 $118,097 100.52% WC = MC + 0.52%
Overall 97.29% $109,657,753 $111,627,057 -$1,969,304 98.23% WC = MC– 1.77%
2011 AWP 86.60% $44,419,718 $65,456,801 -$21,037,083 67.86% WC = AWP—32.14%
2012 94.27% $33,028,284 $53,547,001 -$20,518,717 61.68% WC = AWP—38.32%
2013 96.41% $23,988,919 $39,730,649 -$15,741,730 60.38% WC = AWP—39.62%
Overall 90.94% $101,436,921 $158,734,451 ($57,297,530) 63.90% WC = AWP– 36.10%
2011 WAC 58.46% $36,889,531 $34,953,066 $1,936,465 105.54% WC = WAC + 5.54%
2012 71.84% $29,185,546 $31,136,239 -$1,950,693 93.73% WC = WAC—6.27%
2013 80.12% $21,961,625 $22,608,304 -$646,679 97.14% WC = WAC– 2.86%
Overall 66.98% $88,036,702 $88,697,609 -$660,907 99.25% WC = WAC– 0.745%
2011 FUL 71.89% $31,096,368 $10,885,684 $23,542,460 285.66% WC = FUL + 216.27%
2012 73.44% $19,107,542 $6,458,913 $12,648,629 295.83% WC = FUL + 195.83%
2013 75.56% $13,631,376 $4,403,915 $9,227,461 309.53% WC = FUL + 209.53%
Overall 73.11% $63,835,286 $21,748,512 $42,086,774 293.52% WC = FUL + 193.52%
2011 DP 15.22% $10,924,509 $10,009,569 $914,940 109.14% WC = DP + 9.14%
2012 13.85% $7,281,057 $6,881,417 $399,640 105.81% WC = DP + 5.81%
2013 12.95% $5,656,545 $5,447,692 $208,853 103.83% WC = DP + 3.83%
Overall 14.33% $23,862,111 $22,338,678 $1,523,433 106.82% WC = DP + 6.82%
2011 NADAC 94.76% $50,774,891 $40,104,114 $10,670,777 126.61% WC = NADAC + 26.61%
2012 93.31% $29,008,123 $21,128,000 $7,880,123 137.30% WC = NADAC + 37.30%
2013 94.36% $21,309,744 $15,637,534 $5,672,210 136.27% WC = NADAC + 36.27%
Overall 94.23% $101,092,758 $76,869,648 $24,223,110 131.51% WC = NADAC +31.51%
CAWCS (WC), California Workers’ Compensation System; MC, Medi-Cal; AWP, Average Wholesale Price; WAC, Wholesale Acquisition Cost; DP, Direct Price; FUL,
Federal Upper Limit; NADAC, National Average Drug Acquisition Cost; EC, Estimated Costs; NDC’s, National Drug Code
This table assessed
• The percent of drugs with NDC prices under each pricing benchmarks and the paid cost of these drugs compared to current CAWCS Medi-Cal paid claims.
• The formula  to maintain budget neutrality if switching drug prices from current CAWCS Workman’s’ Compensation (WC) fee-schedule to each Pricing
Benchmark
Fee-schedule for a sample of matched NDCs
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197449.t002
Drug pricing methods in California Workers’ Compensation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197449 May 25, 2018 7 / 15
Patterns of CAWCS drug use and costs over time: The analysis showed that the number of
PD claims and total amount paid for PD claims by CAWCS consistently declined over the
three years. Incomplete claims records might explain this decline. However, this is unlikely
since we allowed at least 3 years for claims resolution. The decline in pharmacy-dispensed
claims was more likely due to a shift of claims from the pharmacy to the physicians, who are
allowed to and frequently dispense drugs within the workers’ compensation system. The
National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI) found that the WC physician-dis-
pensed pharmaceuticals increased from 1.4 to 1.6 prescriptions between 2007 and 2011. There-
fore, this increase likely continues and is offsetting the decrease in PD drug claims that our
analysis shows.[16] Previous studies found that chain pharmacies are less willing than physi-
cians to assume the risk of nonpayment, especially for first-time prescriptions. Early non-
Table 3. Percent of CAWCS claims and differences in paid amount for the percent of CAWCS retail pharmaceuticals with no NDC prices under current workers
compensation Medi-Cal fee-schedule and each alternative pricing benchmark by year.
% CAWCS
claims with drug prices
under different pricing
benchmark
Amount paid by
CAWCS for
claims with drug
prices under
each pricing
benchmark
Total EC by
different pricing
benchmark for
CAWCS claims
with drug prices
available
The difference
between amount
paid by CAWCS
and EC by
different pricing
benchmark
% Change
(amount paid by
CAWCS/ EC by
different pricing
benchmark)
% CAWCS
claims without
drug Prices
under different
pricing
benchmark
Amount paid by
CAWCS for
claims without
drug prices
under each
pricing
benchmark
% (Amount paid
by CAWCS for
claims with no
drug prices
under each
pricing
benchmark
/ Amount paid
by CAWCS for
all claims)
The correlation
between the amount
paid by CAWCS over
estimated costs by
different pricing
benchmark for
Matched NDC’s 
2011 AWP 96.91% $1,156,375 $1,771,929 -$615,554 65.26% 3.09% $16,303 1.39% WC = AWP—34.74%
2012 96.10% $2,540,983 $8,484,421 -$5,943,438 29.95% 3.90% $66,837 2.56% WC = AWP—70.05%
2013 97.31% $1,628,278 $7,429,703 -$5,801,425 21.92% 2.69% $68,846 4.06% WC = AWP—78.08%
Overall 96.70% $5,325,626 $17,686,054 -$12,360,428 30.11% 3.30% $151,983 2.77% WC = AWP—69.89%
2011 WAC 43.04% $506,165 $529,984 -$23,819 95.51% 56.96% $666,511 56.84% WC = WAC—4.49%
2012 69.91% $1,916,630 $5,891,280 -$3,974,650 32.53% 30.09% $691,187 26.50% WC = WAC—67.47%
2013 76.83% $1,375,242 $4,990,529 -$3,615,287 27.56% 23.17% $321,875 18.97% WC = WAC—72.44%
Overall 63.14% $3,798,036 $11,411,794 -$7,613,758 33.28% 36.86% $1,679,576 30.66% WC = WAC -66.72%
2011 FUL 32.79% $263,418 $99,874 $163,544 263.75% 67.21% $909,256 77.54% WC = FUL + 163.75%
2012 9.05% $82,422 $33,872 $48,550 243.33% 90.95% $2,525,396 96.84% WC = FUL + 143.33%
2013 3.11% $9,402 $3,906 $5,496 240.71% 96.89% $1,687,718 99.45% WC = FUL + 140.71%
Overall 15.08% $355,242 $160,874 $194,368 220.82% 84.92% $5,122,369 93.51% WC = FUL + 120.82%
2011 DP 29.06% $427,026 $441,140 -$14,114 96.80% 70.94% $745,649 63.59% WC = DP—3.20%
2012 14.48% $532,365 $525,676 $6,689 101.27% 85.52% $2,075,453 79.59% WC = DP—1.27%
2013 20.28% $364,977 $402,383 -$37,406 90.70% 79.72% $1,332,147 78.49% WC = DP—9.30%
Overall 20.83% $1,324,362 $1,369,198 -$44,836 96.73% 79.17% $4,153,247 75.82% WC = DP—3.27%
2011 NADAC 35.59% $449,534 $496,684 -$47,150 90.51% 64.41% $723,141 61.67% WC = NADAC—9.49%
2012 17.86% $208,957 $230,548 -$21,591 90.63% 82.14% $2,398,861 91.99% WC = NADAC—9.37%
2013 22.19% $237,787 $256,079 -$18,292 92.86% 77.81% $1,459,335 85.99% WC = NADAC—7.14%
(2011kjf
(2012–
2013)
14.82% $896,278 $983,310 -$87,032 91.15% 75.18% $4,581.332 83.64% WC = NADAC -8.85%
CAWCS (WC), California Workers’ Compensation System; MC, Medi-Cal; AWP, Average Wholesale Price; WAC, Wholesale Acquisition Cost; DP, Direct Price; FUL,
Federal Upper Limit; NADAC, National Average Drug Acquisition Cost; EC, Estimated Costs; NDC’s, National Drug Code
This table assessed
• The drug availability under each pricing benchmarks and estimate the cost of these drugs compared to CAWCS claims.
• The percentages of claims and amount paid for drugs that are not benchmarked under each pricing mechanism represent the calculated CAWCS based formulas
using each pricing system to maintain budget neutral
• The percentages of claims and amount paid for drugs that are not benchmarked under each pricing mechanism represent the calculated CAWCS based formulas
using each pricing system to maintain budget neutral
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197449.t003
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payment of treatments is common for patients injured at work. In the same study, pharmacies
reimbursement uncertainties resulted in more workers being required to pay up-front and
seek reimbursement later from workers compensation payers.[5] Therefore physician-dis-
pensed pharmaceuticals can be helpful in this injured population with difficulty accessing
retail pharmacy. Physician dispensing could act to enhance medication compliance[5] since
reports show that as many as 20% of patients failed to get a prescription filled and 30% of
patients did not obtain refills.[7] Physician-dispensed pharmaceuticals accounted for the
majority of all pharmaceutical reimbursement in WC in our study and others,5 but will require
different repricing strategies from the ones suggested here.
This added convenience of allowing physician dispensing likely comes at a price, however.
In CAWCS, one study showed that the cost for PD medicines were three times more than sim-
ilar medications dispensed by retail pharmacies.[5,17] Physicians may dispense repackaged
medications that are not available in retail pharmacies, and these often have higher costs as
well. Our analysis showed that this decline in total PD payments over time was accompanied
by compensating increases over time in the PD drug prices per claim. However this increase is
only about 1.2% per year; much less than the pharmacy inflation rates at that time which were
about 7.5% per year (7.3% in 2011 to 2012, & 8.0% in 2012 to 2013).[18]
Our results showed a slower PD pharmaceutical price increase than was reported by the
Workers’ Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau of California (WCIRB) in 2016 for all
claims,[19] and the 17.6% increase in workers’ compensation, drug costs/claim reported from
2010 to 2011.[20] Increases in the cost/claim of PD drugs can be driven by changing patterns
of prescriptions that shift treatment to newer, more expensive drugs. Further studies are
needed to confirm if the increases in CAWCS drug prices/claim are slowing, as we show.
Medi-Cal as a primary benchmark
We found that the Medi-Cal fee-schedule has prices for the greatest percentage of PD drugs
than any alternative pricing benchmark in the years that we analyzed, which should highlight
it as one of the best pricing benchmarks for CAWCS. However, we also found that this per-
centage decreased over time becoming progressively more limited in the number of drug
prices available for Medi-Cal as the primary-fee-schedule. Therefore, Medi-Cal may no longer
be an ideal primary fee-schedule for CAWCS.[3,11]
As a result and based on our analysis, we recommend two different approaches for imple-
menting alternative pricing mechanisms. First we recommend that CAWCS could maintain
the Medi-Cal fee-schedule as the primary payment mechanism and adopt one of the alterna-
tive pricing benchmarks as a secondary payment mechanism when a drug is not in the Medi-
Cal fee-schedule. Secondly, we recommend alternative pricing benchmarks to the Medi-Cal
fee-schedule as the primary payment mechanism, along with alternative secondary payment
mechanisms. First, each pricing benchmarks value as a primary and a secondary fee-schedule
benchmark is discussed based on the availability of prices. Next their WC based prices to
remain budget neutral are compared.
AWP as a pricing benchmark
Over three years, 93% of CAWCS drugs had an AWP price in the PD claims, presenting as an
ideal primary replacement for the CAWCS fee-schedule pricing benchmark. However, most
payers are moving away from AWP pricing because it is subject to artificial inflation and has
little relationship to actual wholesale prices. Therefore, we suggest that AWP is a poor choice
for CAWCS as a primary price benchmark, despite its having the greatest number of available
prices. For CAWCS drugs that had no Medi-Cal prices in the PD claims, AWP provided a
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price 97% of the time and these percentages increased over time. In 2013, with AWP repricing,
CAWCS would have paid AWP-40% (excluding the dispensing fee) for the claims that had a
price in the Medi-Cal fee-schedule to remain budget neutral, and AWP– 70% for claims with
no Medi-Cal price. These AWP payments were much lower than what CAWCS is currently
required by regulation to pay for drugs that have no prices in Medi-Cal, which is AWP-17%.
[21] AWP could be a secondary benchmark because it has the highest percentage of drug price
coverage for drugs that have no prices under the current fee-schedule and already is the cur-
rent benchmark that is used for pricing the CAWCS fee-schedule when Medi-Cal does not
provide a price. However, if the use of AWP is continued as the secondary benchmark we rec-
ommend using at least AWP-40% formula for payment to maintain better budget neutrality.
NADAC as a pricing benchmark
During the study period, 94% of CAWCS drugs had a NADAC price in the PD CAWCS
claims, making it a strong candidate for an alternative primary pricing benchmark for
CAWCS. NADAC is focused on outpatient prescriptions and over-the-counter prices from
retail community and independent pharmacies,[22] explaining its high percentage of overall
PD drug prices available. NADAC provided a price only 24% of the time for CAWCS drugs
that had no Medi-Cal prices in the PD claims and should therefore not be used as secondary
price benchmark. We recommend that NADAC be used as an alternative to Medi-Cal as the
primary benchmark for all PD CAWCS claims; paying NADAC+36% to remain budget neu-
tral, plus a dispensing fee.
WAC as a pricing benchmark
Only 58.4% of PD CAWCS paid claims had WAC prices in 2011, and although this increased to
80% in 2013, we do not recommend WAC as the primary pricing benchmark as it provides fewer
prices than Medi-Cal and NADAC. WAC provided the most prices though (after AWP) for those
NDCs with no Medi-Cal price (63%), making WAC one of the best secondary price benchmarks.
In 2013, CAWCS would have paid WAC–3% plus a dispensing fee for the 80% of drug NDCs
without a Medi-Cal price to remain budget neutral using WAC prices. Pharmaceutical companies
typically sell drugs to wholesalers at a list price, WAC or WAC–(1 or 2%).[23] WAC-3% is the dis-
count rate received by wholesalers, and is also our recommendation for a secondary benchmark
price. WAC is accessible, administratively simple, has low administrative cost, and is more trans-
parent than AWP. Like AWP, the disadvantage of WAC is that it is not a transaction price and it
is therefore also subject to inflation by manufacturers.[11,12] Wisconsin follows the formula of
WAC-3.8% for generic and WAC+2% for brand drugs dispensed by retail pharmacies.[17,24,25]
We suggest that WAC be used as the second best secondary pricing benchmark, after AWP.
FUL as a pricing benchmark
Between 2011 and 2013, 74% of CAWCS drugs had FUL prices in the CAWCS PD claims, sim-
ilar to WAC and so we do not recommend FUL as a primary pricing benchmark. For CAWCS
drugs that have no Medi-Cal prices in the PD claims, FUL provided a price for only 15% of
claims. This is not surprising since only generic products (at least 3 generics considered) have
an FUL price. If brand-name drugs have no generic equivalent an FUL price would not be
assigned.[26] This suggests that the majority of drugs with no prices in the current CAWCS
fee-schedule are branded drugs. There are three states that use FUL prices as ceiling pricing
benchmarks of reimbursement for Medicaid PD drugs; Florida, Tennessee (for specialty phar-
macy rates), and Utah.[24] FUL can be used as a ceiling price for multiple-source drugs, but
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has fewer prices than other fee-schedules so we do not recommend its use for CAWCS for
either primary or secondary drug pricing.
DP as a pricing benchmark
Over three years, 14% of CAWCS drugs had DP prices in the PD CAWCS claims and DP prices
were available for only 21% of CAWCS drugs that have no Medi-Cal prices in the PD claims.
Therefore, we cannot recommend DP for a primary or secondary pricing benchmark. In 2013,
CAWCS paid DP+4% to remain budget neutral for the small number of drugs that could be priced.
North Dakota and Maryland follow the formula of DP + 8% as an alternative pricing benchmark
for drugs dispensed by retail pharmacies,[24,25] but our analysis found better alternatives.
Recommendations
The use of the current Medi-Cal fee-schedule as the primary CAWCS fee-schedule for PD
drugs is better than all alternatives because it had prices for the largest percentage of drugs com-
pared to all other pricing benchmarks. NADAC also has prices for a high percentage of
CAWCS drugs, and because the available Medi-Cal prices may be decreasing, NADAAC may
be the best alternative primary fee-schedule for CAWC. Any of the fee-schedule reimbursement
approaches however, require combinations of pricing benchmarks. We recommend (Table 4):
1. If Medi-Cal continues to constrict its available fee-schedule prices, we suggest adapting
the Delaware method by using 100% of NADAC which covers prices for the next most number
of claims after Medi-Cal and AWP. Then for those drugs not covered by the NADAC fee-
schedule, we suggest calculating the maximum fee as 60% of AWP of the lowest therapeutically
equivalent drug. Finally, for drugs that are not covered by either NADAC or AWP, we suggest
Table 4. Final recommendation.
Recommendation 1: Reimbursement at 100% of Medi-Cal and for drugs are not covered by a Medi-Cal, calculate the maximum fee as 60% of AWP. For drugs that are
not covered by either Medi-Cal or AWP, calculate the maximum fee as 97% of WAC
100% of Medi-Cal 97.30% $109,657,753 $111,627,060 $1,969,307
60% of AWP 96.70% $5,325,626 $10,611,632 $5,286,006
97% of WAC 0% $0 $0 $0
Drugs that are not covered by the previous pricing benchmarks 0.1% $151,983 $0 $151,983
Total 99.9% $115,135,363 $122,238,692 $7,255,313
Recommendation 2: Reimbursement at 100% of and for drugs are not covered by NADAC, calculate the maximum fee as 60% of AWP. For drugs that are not covered
by either Medi-Cal or AWP, calculate the maximum fee as 97% of WAC
100% of NADAC 94.20% $101,092,760 $76,869,650 -$24,223,110
60% of AWP 88.30% $12,259,281 $17,625,668 $5,366,387
97% of WAC 12.30% $113,513 $117,532 $4,019
Drugs that are not covered by the previous pricing benchmarks 0.6% $1,669,807 $0 $1,669,807
Total 99.4% $115,135,363 $94,612,850 -$17,182,897
Recommendation 3: lower of Medi-Cal or NADAC. Then for those drugs not covered by either Medi-Cal or NADAC, calculate the maximum fee as 60% of AWP
lower of Medi-Cal or NADAC 93.6% $100,196,486 $75,739,896 -$24,456,486
60% of AWP 89.5% $13,155,473 $18,243,674 $5,088,201
Drugs that are not covered by the previous pricing benchmarks 1% $1,783,408 $0 $1,783,408
Total 99% $115,135,363 $93,983,570 -$17,584,877
Note: CAWCS, California Workers’ Compensation System; AWP, Average Wholesale Price; WAC, Wholesale Acquisition Cost; NADAC, National Average Drug
Acquisition Cost.
This table examines the implications of each recommendation and calculates the cost-saving compared to the current CAWCS pricing scheme over three years.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197449.t004
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calculating the maximum fee as 97% of WAC of the lowest therapeutically equivalent drug.
The implications of this choice is more cost-saving than the current CAWCS pricing scheme
with estimated cost savings of $17.1 million over the three years.
2. Our second recommendation for CAWCS is to keep the primary reimbursement at 100%
of Medi-Cal. For drugs without a Medi-Cal price we suggest continuing with AWP as the sec-
ondary pricing benchmark but calculating the maximum fee as 60% of AWP of lowest thera-
peutically equivalent drug for those payments. To remain budget neutral CAWCS would need
to pay 100% Medi-Cal and AWP-75% but since AWP -40% is the best price for brand drugs
defined by CBO we suggest using a more reasonable AWP-60% instead. This results in an
increase in the budget by $7,103,330, however, so AWP-75% could be considered for pricing
the generic drugs to moderate this increase. Finally, for drugs not covered by either Medi-Cal
or AWP (which is only 0.09%), we suggest calculating the maximum fee as 97% of WAC of the
lowest therapeutically equivalent drug.
3. Our third recommendation for CAWCS pricing is to use the lower of Medi-Cal or
NADAC. Then for those drugs not covered by either Medi-Cal or NADAC, we suggest calcu-
lating the maximum fee as 60% of AWP of the lowest therapeutically equivalent drug. The
implications of this choice would be more cost-saving than the current CAWCS pricing
scheme, with estimated cost savings of $17.5 million. Physician dispensed/administered drugs,
compounded drugs, and medical foods have been analyzed separately by our research team
and have different unique policy issues and require different alternatives. The analysis reported
here support our specific recommendations for PD drugs.
Limitations
These results are based on CAWCS data between 2011 and 2013, the latest complete data avail-
able, but more recent data would be helpful in identifying if Medi-Cal fee-schedule list prices
continue to decline as our data suggest. Our data base also included claims that were dupli-
cates, negative payments, and zero payments. Although we worked to eliminate these pay-
ments from our analysis, the accuracy of our decisions about these claims provides uncertainty
to the estimated total CAWCS drug costs and might change our budget analyses. We feel we
handled these factors similarly to other analyses of large claims data bases such as Medicare
(personal Communications, September, 2015). Our results, although a good example of pric-
ing alternatives, may not be generalizable to other states’ WC systems or other public or private
payers because each has different prescribing and reimbursement practices. We suggest that
further study could focus on more detail on the types of drugs that are not benchmarked
under the current and alternative fee-schedules to better determine the reasons behind these
differences.
Conclusion
This study focuses on pricing alternatives for systems using a fee-schedule, and how to adopt
these alternatives while remaining budget neutral. Our analysis allows us to consider the impli-
cations of changing from the current Medi-Cal primary pricing benchmark followed by AWP-
17 as the secondary benchmark to an alternative NADAC fee-schedule. It also allows compari-
son among all pricing alternatives using the CAWCS data to compare their pricing with each
other. We suggest that adopting one of the governmental pricing benchmarks such as Medi-
Cal and NADAC as the primary pricing benchmarks is the best way to obtain the most com-
plete coverage of the drug claims specific to CAWCS while either remaining budget neutral or
lowering total payments. Any governmental pricing benchmark is subject to maintaining price
controls by federal agencies. This may be preferable to adopting one of the private pricing
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benchmarks such as AWP, WAC and DP that could leave CAWCS with a large pharmaceutical
bill in the future, if these prices are allowed to rise without oversight. Since all private pricing
benchmarks are not representative of actual transactions, are subject to inflation, and difficult
to audit, we suggest that it is safer over time to adopt one of the governmental pricing bench-
marks as the primary benchmark in a fee-schedule drug system.
CAWCS’s current Medi-Cal fee-schedule has the highest number of prices for PD drugs
than all alternatives fee-schedules. However, since Medi-Cal coverage is decreasing over time,
we suggest several alternative reimbursement approaches that would price the most CAWCS
PD drugs and calculate the total costs of their adoption. All alternatives likely require combina-
tions of pricing benchmarks but can provide continued access and even savings to CAWCS. A
fee-schedule has limitations for providing a full range of access and price control techniques.
Another alternative that is currently being considered by CAWCS, that is not directly
addressed in our study, is adopting a formulary approach for drug payment rather than using
a fee-schedule. The adoption of an evidence-based formulary has been requested for CAWCS
by the end of 2017 and rule-making is in progress at the time of this writing with expectation
of a January 1, 2018 start date.[27]
CAWCS currently has a very permissive coverage of pharmaceuticals, with almost no
restrictions on drug coverage. This type of mechanism makes controlling drug prices difficult,
and dependent on demand-based approaches. The adoption of a drug formulary would open
up the CAWCS to the types of incentive based supply-side approaches to controlling pharma-
ceutical use and costs and may even improve the quality of drug use. Supply-side approaches
include offering suggestions for preferred drugs based on quality targeted to specific patient
needs, as well as costs. In an era of personalized medicine, CAWCS should consider the formu-
lary approach, which might align drug use better with their current Medi-Cal pricing bench-
mark. Alternatively, they can keep using a fee-schedule and adopt one of the alternative
pricing benchmarks suggested by our study: using NADAC as their primary pricing bench-
mark or using AWP-40% or DP as secondary pricing benchmarks while retaining Medi-Cal as
their primary benchmark.
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